## Message Text

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**EXDIS** 

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE, APRIL 6, FROM CAIRO RPTD TO YOU:

QUOTE S E C R E T CAIRO 1024

**EXDIS** 

DEPARTMENT PASS JIDDA

EO 11652: XGDS-1 TAGS: MOPS, EG, IS, SA

SUBJECT: POSSIBILITY OF BREAK IN EGYPTIAN/ ISRAELI

CEASEFIRE

1. IN CONVERSATION APRIL 4 ARRANGED BY SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR NAZIR AT HIS RESIDENCE, KING FEISAL'S ADVISOR KAMAL ADHAM SAID THAT CURRENT SITUATION IN EGYPT IS DIFFICULT FOR SADAT AND DANGEROUS. HE SAID HE DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER SADAT WILL ATTEMPT START HOSTILITIES, NEITHER DOES HE KNOW HE WILL NOT. ADHAM SAID SAUDI ARABIA WANTS TO HELP AND SUPPORT SADAT IN MEETING HIS PROBLEMS AND IS COUNSELING HIM NOT TO START A FIGHT BECAUSE IT WOULD ALL BE OVER BEFORE SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER ARABS COULD GET THERE TO HELP.

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- 2. ADHAM SAID THAT SADAT'S DOMESTIC POSITION IS SERIOUS FOR HIM BECAUSE THE CIVIL POPULATION IS GETTING RESTIVE UNDER IMPACT OF RISING COSTS OF LIVING AND DISTORTION OF THE ECONOMY CAUSED BY "CONFRONTATION" AND "COMING BATTLE" WITH ISRAEL, AS WELL AS BY THE DRAIN OF REPAYING SOVIETS. SADAT'S SITUATION IS MADE THE MORE DANGEROUS BECAUSE THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS GETTING RESTIVE AND SADAT IS CONCERNED THAT IF THEY ARE NOT DIRECTED TO FIGHT ISRAEL, THEY WILL TURN ON CAIRO AND TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT.
- 3. IN LATTER CONNECTION, ADHAM SAID THAT SADAT'S REASON FOR INVITING THE SOVIET MILITARY OUT LAST SUMMER HAD BEEN HIS FEAR, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, THAT THE SOVIETS INTENDED TO INCREASE THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE IN EGYPT TO THE POINT WHERE THEY, THE SOVIETS, COULD TAKE OVER HIM AND EGYPT. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, ADHAM DISCOUNTED THE REASON THAT SADAT HIMSELF HAD GIVEN, NAMELY THAT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT HAD CONVEYED TO HIM THAT SINCE US AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS HAD AGREED NOT TO CONFRONT EACH OTHER OVER REGIONAL DISPUTES, THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN EGYPT WAS NOT AN ASSET IN EGYPT'S EFFORTS TO GET ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW.
- 4. ADHAM SAID THAT SADAT HAD MISPLAYED THE MOVE BY NOT GETTING ANYTHING FOR IT; THE SAUDIS, INCLUDING ADHAM HIMSELF, HAD EXPECTED AND ADVISED HIM TO WORK A TRADE, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF IMPRESSION SAUDIS HAD GAINED IN WASHINGTON OF IMPORTANCE USG ATTACHED TO SOVIET PRESENCE IN EGYPT.
- 5. ADHAM CONTINUED THAT IN RESPONSE TO WHAT THEY THOUGHT HAD BEEN THE US ADMINISTRATION'S WISH, "WE" (ARABS) HAD HELD OFF BREAKING THE CEASEFIRE IN THE PERIOD BEFORE THE 1972 ELECTIONS; NOW "WE ARE WONDERING WHAT WE HAVE TO SHOW" FOR RESTRAINT. THIS FACTOR WEIGHS IN SADAT'S CALCULATIONS AS WELL AS IN THE CALCULATONS OF THOSE WHO STILL COUNSEL RESTRAINT-- AMONG THEM, ACCORDING TO ADHAM, KING FEISAL AND HIS GOVERNMENT
- 6. ADHAM ARGUED THAT ONE DIMENSION OF THE SITUATION, SECRET

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IN WHICH SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS- - INCLUDING

THE US-- CAN HELP BROADEN SADAT'S PEACEFUL OPTIONS, IS THE ECONOMIC. IF SADAT COULD SOMEHOW INCREASE EGYPT'S OWN EARNINGS, ESPECIALLY IN HARD CURRENCY, AND DILUTE THE TIES TO THE SOVIET ECONOMY, HE WOULD BE BETTER PLACED TO DEAL WITH HIS DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND MILITARY PROBLEMS. THE SUMED PIPELINE PROJECT WOULD BE ONE WAY TO PURSUE THIS; ADHAM'S VIEWS ON THIS PROSPECT ARE ELABORATED IN SEPTEL. GREENE UNQUOTE. ROGERS

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<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* EXDIS

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Current Classification \*\*\* SECRET

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Status: <DBA CORRECTED> gwr 971209 Subject: POSSIBILITY OF BREAK IN EGYPTIAN/ ISRAELI CEASEFIRE

TAGS: MOPS, EG, IS, SA

To: JIDDA

Type: TE

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